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TWO WRONGS DON'T MAKE IT RIGHT:
TITLE VII, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND THE
MISUSE OF STARE DECISIS
Kenneth A. Pilgrim"
More than thirty years ago, LGBT employees across
the United States sought relief from discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming
protection under the statute's guarantee that employers
may not discriminate "because of sex." The federal
Courts of Appeals responded with a unanimous voice.
Title VII does not cover sexual orientation.
That conclusion was
neither shocking nor
controversial in the early 1980's, but the Judiciary's
interpretationof Title VII has changed fundamentally in
the decades since. Multiple Supreme Court decisions
and newly recognized theories of sex discriminationhave
called into question the notion that Title VII has nothing
to do with sexual orientation. More significantly, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission now
maintains the position that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination,
prohibitedby the Civil Rights Act.
The federal courts, however, are conflicted. The law
of employment discrimination may have shifted, but
one venerable principle remains the same: stare decisis.
Faced with their own longstanding precedent on this
issue, the Circuits have shown reluctance to overturn
decisions that are directly on point. This Note seeks to
dispel their hesitation.

Alex Pilgrim is a third-year student at the University of Georgia School of Law, in the
class of 2018. Prior to law school, he graduated from the University of Georgia in 2015 with
a B.A. in English. The author would like to thank Professor Sonja West, who provided
invaluable guidance as an advisor for this Note. He is also extremely grateful to the
editorial members and Executive Board of the Georgia Law Review for their tireless work,
which made this publication possible.
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Intervening decisions of the Supreme Court, most
notably Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, have removed the
legal basis of these earlier appellate cases. The policies
underlying stare decisis, which are rooted in concerns
of stability and reliance, do not support continued
adherence to a view of Title VII that may conflict
sharply with binding decisions of the Supreme Court.
The Courts of Appeals should not invoke stare decisis to
avoid this issue, and instead should evaluate the merits
of this issue anew, taking into account intervening
developments in the law.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss2/8

2

Pilgrim: Two Wrongs Don't Make It Right: Title VII, Sexual Orientation, an

2018]

TWO WRONGS DON'T MAKE IT RIGHT

687

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODU CTION ................................................................... 688

II.

BACKGROUND ..................................................................... 692
A. EARLY SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES ............................... 692
B. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND ITS LEGACY ........................... 696
C. DOCRTINAL DIFFICULTIES AND BALDWIN V. FOXX.......... 699
D. THE "RULES" OF STARE DECISIS ..................................... 701

III.

ANALYSIS ..........................................
A.

1. Statutory Stare Decisis...........................................
2. CircuitP ractices .....................................................
B.

704

HEIGHTENED STANDARDS OF STARE DECISIS
SHOULD NOT APPLY ....................................................... 705

707
709

PRAGMATIC CONCERNS STILL REQUIRE SOME

DEFERENCE TO STARE DECISIS ...................................... 711
C. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK ................................ 712

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
IV .

Workability.............................................................
R eliance ..................................................................
Intervening Legal Developments ............................
Changes in Social Context ......................................
Quality of Reasoning..............................................

C ON CLUSION .......................................................................

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

712
713
714
715
716
717

3

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 8

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

688

[Vol. 52:685

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 13, 2013, Kimberly Hively filed a pro se charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
alleging that her employer, Ivy Tech Community College (Ivy
Tech), had discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 1 The facts underlying her
claim were simple. Hively alleged that, although she had worked
for the college as a part-time adjunct professor for over a decade
and met all the necessary requirements for full-time employment,
Ivy Tech consistently refused to interview her for a full-time
position "on the basis of sexual orientation."2 Failing to obtain
relief through EEOC proceedings, Hively re-filed her complaint in
the Northern District of Indiana, where it was again dismissed for
failure to state a claim. 3
At this stage, Hively's story was unremarkable in all ways but
one: she was exceptionally bold (some would say foolish) to pursue
this type of claim. The text of Title VII provides only that
employers may not discriminate "because of [an] individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."4 Thus, because the statute
does not list "because of sexual orientation" among its prohibitions,
Hively needed to argue that such discrimination is, in actuality,
"because of sex." Many would have viewed that argument as
futile, however, because the Seventh Circuit had long since
5
considered and rejected that exact interpretation of Title VII.
Indeed, every circuit court to confront this question had similarly
held that the statute's proscription of sex discrimination does not

1 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., S. Bend, 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended
853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
(Aug. 3, 2016), rev'd en banc sub noma.
2

Id.

3 Id.

4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).

5 See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir.
2000), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2017)
("[H]arassment based solely upon a person's sexual preference or orientation.., is not an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII."); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d
1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 399
(7th Cir. 2017) (delivering the same holding).
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extend to sexual orientation.6 In short, Hively's case was doomed
from the start, or at least at the time she brought it.
Yet, as it turned out, the fortuitous timing of Hively's appeal
would make her case a significant one. On July 15, 2015, the
EEOC announced its new position on this exact question, deciding
for the first time in Baldwin v. Foxx that claims of sexual
orientation discrimination are cognizable under Title VII. 7 That
decision, although binding only in the context of federal
employment, 8 gave newfound legitimacy to this type of claim.
Commentators immediately began to speculate that Baldwin
might persuade the federal courts to reconsider those prior cases
that had foreclosed Hively's suit in 2013, and some were optimistic
that the EEOC's ruling could spur a similar development in the
private sector. 9 Thus, when the Seventh Circuit decided Hively's
appeal in July 2016, the court recognized that it was the first of
the federal circuits to address this issue "in the shadow of [the
EEOC's] criticism...."10
The stage was set for Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College to
become a watershed case in the debate over Title VII's scope, but
the panel's decision was not a decisive victory for either side. The
opinion began with a concise statement of the court's holding; even
in light of Baldwin, Seventh Circuit precedent still mandated the
conclusion that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. 11 As the
6 See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) ('Title VII does not proscribe
discrimination because of sexual orientation.'); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts
under Title VII.1); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001)
('Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.'); Hopkins v. Bait.
Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751-52 (4th Cir. 1996) ('Title VII does not prohibit conduct
based on the employee's sexual orientation .. . .').
7 See Baldwin, 0120133080 (EEOC), 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15, 2015) ("[A]n
allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex
discrimination under Title VII.').
8 See Hively, 830 F.3d at 703 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that Baldwin "applies only to
federal government employees" and does not bind private employers).
9 See, e.g., Shane T. Mufioz & David M. Kalteux, LGBT, the EEOC, and the Meaning of
"Sex," 90 FLA B.J. 43, 46 (2016) (predicting that "courts w[ould] be called upon to reconsider
established precedent"); J. Levi Stoneking, Baldwin v. Department of Transportation: Is
Sexual Orientation Already Protected by Title VII?, 25 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 181, 191
(2016) (arguing for decisive intervention from the Supreme Court on this issue).
10 Hively, 830 F.3d at 699.
11 Id.
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court itself noted, all analysis could have ended there. 12 Yet it did
not. Instead, the Hively panel moved into a substantial, even
exhaustive, discussion of Baldwin and the legal history that

preceded

it.13

Given the simplicity of the outcome, we might ask why the
Seventh Circuit would devote so much time and analysis to this
subject. One reason, it seems, was to dispel the notion that the
federal courts have "reflexively declare[d] that sexual orientation
is not cognizable under Title VII without due analysis or
consideration of intervening case law." 14 If the court's goal truly
was to confirm the validity of the status quo, however, then it did
quite a poor job. Far from refuting the EEOC's interpretation of
Title VII, the opinion expressed agreement with each of Baldwin's
15
underlying rationales.
Not only this, the Hively court also emphasized that numerous
district courts, bound by similar precedent within their own circuits,
have struggled to justify the exclusion of sexual orientation from
Title V's purview.1 6 Indeed, for those who held hope that Baldwin
federal
in
development
important
an
signal
would
antidiscrimination law, the Seventh Circuit's analysis was perfect
in nearly every respect. Every respect, of course, except for the only
one that mattered: its conclusion. Although the court predicted that
the current rule of law would soon prove intolerable,1 7 it nonetheless
chose to await congressional action or guidance from the Supreme
18
Court rather than overrule precedent.
It would be an understatement to say that, for many advocates of
LGBT rights, the Hively panel's decision was a disappointment.
Even more troubling, however, was the possibility that the case's
consequences could reach far beyond a single circuit, given its
12 Id. at 699-700 ('This panel could make short shrift of its task ... by referencing two
cases ... in which this court held that Title VII offers no protection from nor remedies for
sexual orientation discrimination.").
13 See generally id.
14 Id. at 699.
15 See id. at 705-12, 714-18 (addressing each of the EEOC's arguments in turn).
16 See id. at 713 ("In short, the district courts ... are beginning to ask whether the sexual
orientation-denying emperor of Title VII has no clothes.").
17 See id. at 718 ("It seems unlikely that our society can continue to condone a legal

structure in which employees can be... discriminated against solely based on who they date,
love, or marry.").
18 Id.
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unique status as the first federal appeal to examine this issue postBaldwin. Emboldened by new support from the EEOC, albeit in the
form of a ruling that binds only government employers, privatesector employees in other jurisdictions have also begun to re-litigate
this issue. 19 When some of these claims inevitably become appellate
cases, the panel's reasoning could become a roadmap for other
circuits to reach the same conclusion. This forces us to ask: was the
Hively court correct to reaffirm its prior decisions?2 0
The answer to that question is not inconsequential. Under the
currently prevailing interpretation of the statute, which refuses to
recognize these claims, any private employees experiencing unjust
treatment on the basis of their sexual orientation must look to
state law for relief. Most of them will not find it there either, since
nearly half of the states do not provide protections against such
discrimination. 2 1 Thus, this is not a debate over minor statutory
nuance; these decisions will have drastic ramifications on the
dignity and livelihood of numerous individuals. In light of these

19 See, e.g., Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 598, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
('plaintiff responds by arguing that Title VII should be expanded to recognize sexual
orientation claims .... "); Garvey v. Childtime Learning Ctr., No. 5:16-cv-1073 (TJMIATB),
2016 WL 6072395, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2016) ("Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
discriminated against him in hiring because of his sexual orientation....').
20 In 2017, the full Seventh Circuit reheard Hively's case and reversed the panel's
decision,
becoming the first of the federal circuits to determine that Title VII encompasses sexual
orientation. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2017)
("[A] person who alleges ... employment discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation
has put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.'). The Second Circuit has
agreed, deepening the circuit split on this issue. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d
100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) ("[W]e now hold that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation as discrimination 'because of ... sex.'"). The broader consequences of these
developments remain to be seen, but it is far from certain that the other circuits will fall in
line with the Seventh and Second. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed the
majority view that Title VII does not reach sexual orientation, using an analysis similar to
that of the original Hively panel. See Evans v. Georgia Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2017) (dismissing the plaintiffs sexual orientation claim because "[o]ur binding precedent
forecloses such an action" under Title VII) (citing Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938
(5th Cir. 1979)). This Note therefore asserts that the other circuits should not follow the
analysis of the original Hively panel, as the Eleventh Circuit has, and seeks to provide an
alternative framework by which to evaluate their prior cases.
21 See Joseph Altieri, Andrew Cho & Matthew A. Issa, Employment Discrimination
Against LGBT Persons, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 247, 249 (2016) (compiling statutes and
executive orders from the "thirty states ... that expressly prohibit workplace discrimination
based on sexual orientation'.
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high stakes, the choice to uphold precedent and defer to stare
decisis cannot go unscrutinized.
This Note will attempt to demonstrate that stare decisis does
not require the circuit courts to maintain their current
interpretation of Title VII's sex discrimination provision. Part II
will describe how this body of law has developed to its present
state, as well as the unusual paths that it has taken at several key
junctures. It also will describe the basic underlying principles of
stare decisis and the considerations that the federal courts take
into account when reexamining precedent. Part III will apply
those principles to the problem at hand and attempt to propose an
appropriate framework for evaluating the circuits' earlier cases on
this subject. It then will aim to show that, under this framework,
the circuit courts should choose to overturn their precedent,
holding instead that claims of sexual orientation discrimination
are cognizable as sex discrimination claims under Title VII.
II.BACKGROUND
A. EARLY SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES

The notion that Title VII extends to sexual orientation is older
than one might think. The Hively court considered itself bound by
22
Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc. and
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 23 both of which were decided in 2000,
but those cases themselves relied upon another decision from
nearly two decades earlier. In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., a
pilot asserted that her employer violated Title VII by wrongfully
24
discharging her on the basis of her transsexual status. Although
the court's holding only pertained directly to claims of transsexual
discrimination, the substantial overlap between issues of sexual
identity and issues of sexual orientation made it necessary to
address the status of both classifications under the statute.
The district court had determined that "the term 'sex' as used in
the statute is not synonymous with 'sexual preference,"' a
224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853
F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2017).
853
23 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind.,
F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2017).
24 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984).
22

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss2/8

8

Pilgrim: Two Wrongs Don't Make It Right: Title VII, Sexual Orientation, an
2018]

TWO WRONGS DON'T MAKE IT RIGHT

693

conclusion echoed by other jurisdictions, 25 yet it also concluded
that transsexual individuals were nonetheless a distinguishable
and protected class because they experience unique issues of
"sexual identity."26 In reversing the district court, the Seventh
Circuit agreed with the finding that "homosexuals and
transvestites do not enjoy Title VII protection," 27 instead
dismissing the plaintiffs claim on the separate ground that
transsexual status also falls outside the statute's scope. 28
To reach the conclusion that Title VII protects neither sexual
identity nor sexual orientation, Ulane devoted much discussion to
the legislative history of the sex discrimination provision. More
accurately, the court gave decisive weight to the lack of legislative
history and emphasized the last-minute addition of the "sex
amendment" shortly before Title VII's approval in the House of
Representatives. 29 It further cited numerous attempts to add a
new provision prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation, all of which had failed. 30 Given this ambiguous
legislative record, the court found no basis to support an "allencompassing interpretation" of the statute, which in its view
would have constituted "a broad sweeping of the untraditional and
the unusual within the term 'sex' as used in Title VII." 31
Although Ulane had much to say about sexual orientation and
Title VII, however, it was ultimately not a sexual orientation case.
The court only needed to determine the status of transsexual
persons under Title VII, and thus any of the court's assumptions
regarding sexual orientation were (at least at this time) merely

25 Id. at 1084 (first citing Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982) (per curiam); then citing De Santis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d
327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979); then citing Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d
325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978); then citing Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659,
662 (9th Cir. 1977); and then citing Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp.
456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978)).
26
27

Id.
Id.

28 See id. at 1087 ('Title VII is not so expansive in scope as to prohibit discrimination
against transsexuals....').
2 See id. at 1085 ('The total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment
coupled with the circumstances of the amendment's adoption clearly indicates that Congress
never considered nor intended... anything other than the traditional concept of sex.').
- Id.

31 Id. at 1085-86.
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dicta. 32 Even if the Seventh Circuit had directly resolved this
question in 1984, however, it would not have been the first circuit
to do so. Indeed, Ulane's discussion of Title VII and its legislative
history was strikingly similar to, and almost certainly influenced
by, other opinions in which the federal circuits had squarely
addressed the statute's applicability to claims based in sexual
orientation. As early as 1979, for instance, the Ninth Circuit held
that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination applied only to
"traditional notions" of sex and not to "sexual preference[s] such as
homosexuality."33 In a manner similar to Ulane, the court
supported its narrow reading of the sex discrimination provision
by referencing several failed legislative attempts to amend the
34
Civil Rights Act.
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar holding in Smith v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., which affirmed the principle that "the Civil
Rights Act does not forbid discrimination based on affectional or
In reaching that conclusion, the court
sexual preference." 35
principally relied upon its prior decision in Willingham v. Macon
Telegraph PublishingCo., where it had dismissed a Title VII claim
challenging disparate grooming standards for male and female
employees. 36 The plaintiff argued there, unsuccessfully, that a
potential employer discriminated against him on the basis of sex
by rejecting him for his hair length, an objection it had not applied
37
to female applicants.
One might ask how a case about men's hairstyles could have
anything to do with sexual orientation. The answer laid in
Willingham's detailed discussion of a concept called "sex-plus"
discrimination. Courts and commentators of the day defined this
type of discrimination as "the classification of employees on the
basis of sex plus one other ostensibly neutral characteristic." 38 The
32 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., S. Bend, 830 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2016), as
amended (Aug. 3, 2016), rev'd en banc sub nom. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting several
of U/ane's statements regarding sexual orientation and characterizing them as dicta).
33 DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
3 See DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329 ("Several bills have been introduced ... to prohibit
discrimination against 'sexual preference.' None have been enacted into law.").
35 569 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1978).
36 Id. (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1086-87 (5th Cir. 1975)).
37 Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1086-87.
38 Id. at 1089.
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Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "sex-plus" discrimination did
violate Title VII, 39 but the court nonetheless found it necessary to
limit this doctrinal category. 40 In drawing these boundaries, the
opinion emphasized that the "meager legislative history" regarding
Title VII's sex amendment "provide[d] slim guidance for divining
Congressional intent."41 The court therefore concluded, "by way of
negative inference ... [that] Congress ... did not intend for its
proscription of sexual discrimination to have significant and
sweeping implications," and it declined to extend Title VII's
coverage into unfamiliar areas without more conclusive evidence of
42
a legislative mandate.
As these examples illustrate, the early cases applying Title
VII's prohibition on sex discrimination followed similar lines of
reasoning and voiced similar concerns. Each court began with two
basic premises. First, the words "because of sex" allow space for a
wide range of readings, both expansive and restrictive. Second,
the legislative record surrounding the amendment is unusually
sparse, and it provides almost no guidance for the judiciary when
interpreting that language. Faced with such uncertainty, the
circuits tended to conclude that the most prudent way to apply this
provision was to apply it as little as possible. 43 In any situation
where coverage was remotely questionable, as was the case with
sexual orientation, transgender identity, and evidently male
grooming habits, the plaintiff claiming a novel basis for sex
discrimination faced an uphill battle of Sisyphean proportions.

39 Id. (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)).
40 See id. at 1090 ("We must decide... whether a line'can legitimately be drawn beyond
which employer conduct is no longer within reach of the statute.").
41

Id.

42

Id.

The courts frequently expressed reluctance to expand Title VII's "sex amendment"
beyond what was perceived to be its core purpose: redress for past discrimination against
women in the workforce. See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982) ("mhe major thrust of [Title VIrs] 'sex' amendment was towards providing equal
opportunities for women.') (first citing Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896
(9th Cir. 1974); then citing Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.
1971); and then citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971)).
4
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B. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND ITS LEGACY

Because of the hesitation with which the lower courts were
approaching this area of law, Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination continued to pack only a feeble punch until the
Supreme Court eventually began to weigh in on the subject. One
case in particular, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins," represented a
key turning point for Title VII jurisprudence. The plaintiff, Ann
Hopkins, claimed her accounting firm discriminated against her on
the basis of sex during her bid for partner status.4 5 If Hopkins had
asserted that the firm denied her promotion solely because she was
a woman, her case could have been resolved by a straightforward
application of preexisting Title VII doctrine, breaking no new
ground in the process. Instead, however, she alleged a different
and subtler form of discrimination.
The evidence suggested that, although partners and clients
alike praised Hopkins for her exemplary work, several partners
responded negatively to her blunt demeanor, aggressive
personality, and personal appearance. 46 Hopkins asserted that her
superiors viewed these traits negatively only because they found
them unbecoming in a woman One partner in particular advised
that Hopkins would improve her chances of attaining partnership
if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely . . .and wear jewelry. '47 Thus, her rejection did
not result from being a woman; it resulted from a failure to
comport with her employers' views of how women should conduct
themselves.
Perhaps unexpectedly, given the prior behavior of the circuits,
the Supreme Court agreed with Hopkins that such treatment
violated Title VII, and it stated in conclusive terms that the
48
statute forbids employers from engaging in "sex stereotyping."
The opinion asserted "we are beyond the day when an employer
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
45

Id. at 232.

See id. at 234-35 (describing the criticisms of Hopkins' superiors, which focused on her
"abrasiveness," and "macho[ness]').
47 Id. at 235.
48 Id. at 251.
46
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matched the stereotype associated with their group." 49
Significantly, the Court expressly found that this interpretation of
Title VII was consistent with congressional intent, 50 undeterred by
the minimal legislative record that had paralyzed the lower courts.
By acknowledging that "sex stereotyping" is merely an indirect
manifestation of sex discrimination, Price Waterhouse gave a more
formidable bite to Title VII. Per definitive interpretation of the
Supreme Court, the intended function of the statute's "sex
amendment" was not just to provide greater job opportunities for
women, as the lower courts had consistently maintained; its
objective was to combat all differential treatment of individuals
based on sex, whether arising directly from sex itself or from
preconceived notions and expectations regarding a person's sex.
This view of the statute's purpose established the basis for a
new variety of Title VII claims: the "sex stereotyping" claim.
Although the broad language of Price Waterhouse did not establish
any concrete framework to use when evaluating such claims, many
plaintiffs have since enjoyed considerable success under the sex
stereotyping theory. Application of this doctrine has varied, but
the lower courts have consistently reaffirmed the general principle
that an employer may not discriminate based on personal or
societal standards of masculine and feminine behavior.5 1
From a purely theoretical standpoint, it might seem that
discrimination based on sexual orientation should fit cleanly
within this category. After all, if it violates Title VII for an
employer to insist that women should conform to social stereotypes
about jewelry or tone of voice, then why should that same
employer be able to discriminate based on the equally sex-linked
notion that men should date only women and women should date
only men? Indeed, as the facts of many "sexual stereotyping cases"
49 Id.

0 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 ("[In forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.").
51 See, e.g., Collins v. Cohen Pontani Lieberman & Pavane, No. 04 CV 8983(KMW)(MHD),
2008 WL 2971668, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (sustaining female plaintiffs claim of sex
discrimination based on "stereotypes that women should be 'sweet' and non-aggressive");
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[Ihe holding in
Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too
feminine.').
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demonstrate, harassment based on noncompliance with gender
norms is frequently accompanied by accusations (or at least
52
insinuations) of homosexuality.
The federal courts did not agree with this line of reasoning,
however, and instead they consistently reaffirmed in the years
following Price Waterhouse that sexual orientation discrimination is
not within the scope of Title VII. Once again, the Seventh Circuit's
approach to this issue is illustrative. Faced with renewed litigation
questioning the status of sexual orientation under the statute, the
court maintained that its prior holding in Ulane remained
dispositive, with scant regard for any intervening changes in the
larger legal landscape. 53 One plaintiff, for instance, brought a claim
of sex stereotyping after several coworkers berated him with
sexually explicit comments, many of which pertained to his
"apparent homosexuality." 54 The court dismissed this, stating that
stereotypical statements do not run afoul of Title VII if they express
55
hostility only toward an individual's sexual orientation.
The other circuits reached the same conclusion in similar cases.
Despite numerous arguments that sexual orientation discrimination
should be actionable under a sex-stereotyping theory, the courts
made short work of such claims on the basis of the "settled law" that
Yet many
Title VII does not proscribe such treatment. 56
52 See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding a
viable sex-stereotyping claim where plaintiffs superior referred to him as a "pu-y,"
"princess," and "fa---ot'); Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir.
2010) (sustaining a sex-stereotyping claim where a superior said that plaintiff had "an Ellen
DeGeneres kind of look').
63 See Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir.
2000) (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)) ('The reality is
that there is a distinction between one's sex and one's sexuality under Title VII .... ),
overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 1984)).
54 See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he
graffiti... specifically stated that Spearman is 'gay,' a 'fag,' and compared him to a drag
queen .... .'), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2017).
55 See id. at 1085-86.
56 See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)
(first citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751-52 (4th Cir. 1996); then
citing Williamson v. KG. Edwards & Sons, 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)) ('Title VII does
not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation."); see also Simonton v.
Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) ('The law is well-settled in this circuit and in all
others to have reached this question that... Title VII does not prohibit harassment or
discrimination because of sexual orientation."), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
No. 15-3775, 2018 WL 1040820 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018).
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jurisdictions wrestled with the fact that homosexuals often
experience harassment both for their sexual orientation itself and
for their failure to meet other norms of masculine or feminine
behavior. In such instances, the courts have remained unwilling to
invoke Price Waterhouse if the harassers appeared to be
57
substantially motivated by sexual orientation per se.
Thus, while Price Waterhouse may have announced a departure
from the restrictive readings of Title VII previously applied by the
lower courts, the legal options for those abused because of their
sexual orientation remained effectively unchanged. Whatever
undefined list of sex-based stereotypes might fall within the
statute's protection, the courts insisted that prejudices regarding
sexual orientation could not be among them. On the basis of "wellsettled" precedent, that breed of discrimination must exist in a
class by itself, even if its boundaries frequently overlap with those
of proscribed forms of discrimination.
C. DOCRTINAL DIFFICULTIES AND BALDWIN V. FOXX

After several decades of interpreting Title VII's sex
discrimination provision, two doctrinal points were now wellestablished: (1) allegations of discrimination based on "sex
stereotypes" (also termed "gender nonconformity") can support a
claim, and (2) discrimination based on sexual orientation does not
fall within this category. These principles were easy enough to
state, but far from easy to apply in actual cases. The central
difficulty, as articulated by the Second Circuit in 2005, was thus:
'When utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff.., gender
stereotyping claims can easily present problems for an adjudicator.
This is for the simple reason that '[s]tereotypical notions about

17 See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he harassment
of which Vickers complains is more properly viewed as harassment based on Vickers'
perceived homosexuality, rather than based on gender non-conformity."); Martin v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434, 447 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting a sexstereotyping claim on the grounds that "[t]he torment endured by Martin, as reprehensible
as it is, relate[d] to his sexual orientation," and further asserting that "the conduct must be
aimed at masculinity or perceived lack thereof' to be actionable).
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how men and women should behave will often necessarily blur into
ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.' "58
A brief survey of recent case law reveals this observation is an
understatement. The courts have struggled to locate a dividing
line between valid sex stereotyping claims, which are cognizable
under Title VII, and claims of sexual orientation discrimination,
which are not.59 Yet struggle they must, for the circuits have
made clear that plaintiffs may not use Price Waterhouse to
"bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII."6 0 As a
result, sex discrimination claims run a heavy risk of dismissal if
the complaint contains any reference to the plaintiffs sexuality (or
perceived sexuality). When such references to sexual orientation
are present, many courts have been quick to conclude that
impermissible "bootstrapping" is afoot, thereby dooming the
61
plaintiffs chances of relief.
It is against this backdrop that the EEOC delivered its decision
in Baldwin v. Foxx. The complainant in Baldwin did not attempt
to disguise the true basis for his claim as others had; he instead
alleged plainly that he "was denied a permanent position because
of his sexual orientation."6 2 In federal court, this approach would
have led to quick dismissal, but the Commission did not take that
course. Instead it determined, contrary to the then-unanimous
position of the federal judiciary, that sexual orientation
discrimination is actionable in its own right under Title VII
58 Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Howell v. N.
Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004)), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., No. 15-3775, 2018 WL 1040820 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018).
69 See, e.g., Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (D. Mass. 2002) ("[T]he line
between discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of sex
[stereotypes] is hardly clear."); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir.
2009) ("[T]he line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination 'because of
sex' can be difficult to draw.").
60 Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218 (quoting Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38); see also Magnusson v. Cty.
of Suffolk, No. 14-CV-3449(SJF)(ARL), 2016 WL 2889002, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2016)
("[P]laintiffs may not shoehorn what are truly claims of sexual orientation discrimination into
Title VII by framing them as claims of discrimination based on gender stereotypes .... ').
61 See, e.g., Burrows v. Coll. of Cent. Fla., No. 5:14-cv-197-Oc-30PRL, 2015 WL 4250427,
at *9 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2015) ("Plaintiffs claim, although cast as a claim for gender
stereotype discrimination, is merely a repackaged claim for discrimination based on sexual
orientation...."); Pagan v. Holder, 741 F. Supp. 2d 687, 695 (D.N.J. 2010), aff'd sub nom.
Pagan v. Gonzalez, 430 F. App'x 170 (3d Cir. 2011) ('This is a hollow attempt to ... recast a
sexual orientation claim as a gender stereotyping claim.').
62 Baldwin, 0120133080 (EEOC), 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (July 15, 2015).
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because such discrimination is inherently based on sex.63 Thus,
employees of the federal government may now seek relief under
Title VII for sexual orientation discrimination. 64
As the Hively panel demonstrated, the courts have not turned a
blind eye to the EEOC's recent stance or the doctrinal problems in
this area. Some district courts, while continuing to dismiss sexual
orientation claims in accordance with the views of their respective
circuits, have predicted that change is imminent. 65 So long as
most of the circuits continue to insist that principles of stare
decisis require them to maintain their long-held positions,
however, such cases remain outliers that are contrary to the
prevailing law of the land.
D. THE "RULES" OF STARE DECISIS

Before assessing whether the courts are correct to invoke stare
decisis in this context, one first needs to examine the principles
that govern the doctrine and its application. Its basic rationale
has always been clear; adherence to prior cases is the default of
our judicial process because it "promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process."66 Stare decisis flows
from the recognition that stability is valuable for its own sake, and
it requires us to tolerate the occasional survival of wrongly decided
cases on the grounds that "in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right."6 7

6 See id. at *5 ("A complainant alleging that an agency took his or her sexual orientation
into account... necessarily alleges that the agency took his or her sex into account.").
64 See id. at *10 ("Agencies should treat claims of sexual orientation discrimination as
complaints of sex discrimination under Title VII and process such complaints through the
ordinary Section 1614 process.").
65 See, e.g., Matavka v. Bd. of Educ., No. 15 C 10330, 2016 WL 4119949, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 1, 2016) (stating that the EEOC's decision has created a renewed "ferment as to the
scope and meaning of the word 'sex' in Title VII").
66 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,
265-66 (1986)).
67 Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)); see also Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) ("Indeed,
stare decisis has consequence only to the extent it sustains incorrect decisions; correct
judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up.").
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Yet it is equally clear that stability is not valuable enough to
justify every mistaken outcome. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
has often reaffirmed that stare decisis is not an "inexorable
command" or a "mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision," and it must occasionally give way to other
considerations.6 8 Few would argue with these central ideas, but
they are almost as unhelpful as they are uncontroversial. Taken at
this level of generality, stare decisis becomes little more than a
notion that courts should typically stick to their earlier
conclusions-except when they should not. One might expect the
Supreme Court to have provided a practical framework for the
judiciary to use when reexamining questions of federal law, but it
has yet to do so.
Instead, the Court has tended to apply only a loose set of factors
that either heighten or diminish the strength of stare decisis in a
particular situation. The Court traditionally asks such questions
as: (1) whether experience has proven the rule to be unworkable, (2)
whether the rule has generated substantial reliance, (3) whether
related principles of law have shifted or developed in a way that
weakens the underpinnings of the rule, (4) whether circumstances
have changed, or come to be seen differently, in a way that removes
the justifications for the rule, and (5) whether the precedent was
well-reasoned. 69 Arguments that a prior case was simply incorrect
on the merits, unaccompanied by at least one of these other
70
elements, are not sufficient to outweigh stare decisis.
In addition to these considerations, the Court has maintained
that one other factor alters the analysis in a significant way;

Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (stating
that the choice to overrule a case is guided by "a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations," including workability, reliance interests, developments in related law, and
shifts in factual circumstances); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-74
(1989) (listing "intervening development of the law," "inherent confusion created by an
unworkable decision," and "inconsisten[cy] with the sense of justice or with the social
welfare" as justifications for overturning a case); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010) ("Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether
to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance
interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned." (quoting Montejo
v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009)).
70 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) ("[We
require 'special justification,' not just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided.').
68
69
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decisions interpreting statutes receive much greater deference
than those dealing with constitutional issues, procedural matters,
or common law doctrines. The reasons for this distinction are
related to our government's structure of separated powers, in
which Congress holds the ultimate authority to correct any
mistaken interpretation of its own laws. 71 In theory, stricter
adherence to precedent in the statutory context preserves the
institutional relationship of Congress and the Judiciary, and it
also incentivizes the legislative branch to amend its own work
72
rather than rely on judicial interpretation.
The statutory breed of stare decisis, though still not an
"inexorable command," is an especially potent form that can be
overcome only by especially persuasive reasons.73 Indeed, of the
factors listed above, the Court typically finds only (1)
unworkability and (2) subsequent changes in the law to have much
weight in the statutory context, likely because those types of
arguments also deal with structural concerns.7 4
The Supreme Court, of course, speaks from a unique position on
this topic, since its own decisions are not subject to further judicial
review. Stare decisis takes on an added dimension for the lower
courts, which must defer both to Congress and to the Supreme
Court's rulings.
For this reason, the circuits tend to view
themselves as operating under an even more rigorous version of
the doctrine, and they are reluctant to disturb their prior cases
without some type of action by one of these higher authorities. 75
71 See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) ("[C]ritics of our
ruling can take their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any mistake it
sees.").
72 See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 296 (1996) ('Were we to alter our statutory
interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its
responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair.").
73 Id.; see also Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172 (explaining that, although "precedents are not
sacrosanct," concerns of stare decisis "have special force in the area of statutory
interpretation").
74 See, e.g., Patterson,491 U.S. at 173 (stating that intervening developments in the law
are the "primary reason" for overturning statutory precedents, and describing workability
as "[a]nother traditional justification").
75 See United States v. Lara-Unzueta, 735 F.3d 954, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[P]rinciples of
stare decisis require that we give considerable weight to prior decisions of this court unless
and until they have been overruled or undermined by the decisions of a higher court, or
other supervening developments, such as a statutory overruling." (quoting Santas v. United
States, 461 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2006))); see also Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900
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Viewed against these background principles, Hively's outcome is
less surprising than it might have first appeared; plaintiffs
seeking to overturn circuit precedent on a question of statutory
interpretation must overcome stare decisis at its apex, which is a
76
heavy burden indeed.
III. ANALYSIS
As noted above, the issue of whether Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on sexual orientation is both (1) a question of
statutory interpretation and (2) a question that has only been
addressed directly by the circuit courts. When both of these
elements are present, stare decisis normally operates with special
force and typically will not give way to anything less than direct
action by Congress or the Supreme Court. In this context, however,
the universal failure of the circuit courts to meaningfully analyze
Price Waterhouse undermines the structural justifications that give
rise to heightened forms of stare decisis. Nevertheless, the fact that
these decisions exist at all, and have been in existence for several
decades without any disagreement among the circuits, continues to
provide some cause to leave the current rule unchanged. Thus, in
these circumstances, this Note contends that the courts should not
await further action by Congress or the Supreme Court, as they
normally would be inclined to do, but should themselves apply the
"pragmatic considerations" that guide the stare decisis inquiry in
cases of common law or constitutional interpretation.

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("We must recognize that we are an intermediate appellate court.
A goal of our circuit's decisions, including panel and en banc decisions, must be to preserve
the consistency of circuit law.").
76 In fact, Hively would have faced yet another obstacle if she had taken her case
elsewhere. Most circuits do not permit panels of the court to overturn precedent at all, and
instead require a rehearing en banc. See, e.g., Kerman v. Comm'r, 713 F.3d 849, 866 (6th
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (requiring a rehearing en banc unless circuit precedent is in conflict
with a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court); Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592,
604 (1st Cir. 2010) (requiring a rehearing unless "recent Supreme Court precedent calls [the
prior holding] into legitimate question" (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475
F.3d 434, 442 (1st Cir. 2007))). For the sake of efficiency, this Note's analysis assumes that
such procedural requirements are satisfied and approaches the issues from the perspective
of a circuit sitting en banc.
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A. HEIGHTENED STANDARDS OF STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT APPLY

Let us begin with a hypothetical case. Imagine that, in 2000, the
Seventh Circuit hears the appeal of a sex discrimination claim. The
complaint alleges numerous derogatory remarks pertaining to the
plaintiffs sexuality. The plaintiff contends that such discrimination
constitutes "sex stereotyping" under Price Waterhouse and is
therefore proscribed by Title VII, while the defendant points to
several Seventh Circuit precedents concluding that Title VII does
not protect sexual orientation. Because this is the first time that
any circuit has considered whether the theory of Price Waterhouse
encompasses sexual orientation, the court examines the
applicability of that case, but it nonetheless concludes that the
Supreme Court did not intend its holding to reach so far.
Now imagine a second hypothetical case. Kimberly Hively
challenges the precedent described above on the grounds that it
was poorly reasoned and incorrectly interpreted Price Waterhouse.
The outcome of this case would be simple and inevitable because,
even if the court did err in its interpretation, stare decisis
demands more than an argument that the prior case was wrong on
the merits. 77 The Supreme Court is free to clarify its own decision,
and Congress is free to amend the statute at issue, but the
Seventh Circuit will not freely contradict its earlier interpretation
of a Supreme Court case.
This scenario provides a neat and tidy application of stare
decisis, but it is not what actually occurred. In Spearman v. Ford
Motor Co., one of the two cases that controlled this issue in the
Seventh Circuit prior to the recent Hively decision, the plaintiff did
argue that his harassers were motivated by sex stereotypes when
they disparaged his sexual orientation. 78 Yet without even a brief
discussion of whether such behavior might fall within the scope of
Price Waterhouse, the court merely cited Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., one of the Seventh Circuit's own prior decisions, for the
proposition that "harassment based solely upon a person's sexual
77 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78 See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[Spearman]

claims that the vulgar and sexually explicit insults and graffiti of his harassers were
motivated by 'sex-stereotypes' because his co-workers perceived him to be too feminine to fit
the male image at Ford.'), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339
(7th Cir. 2017).
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preference or orientation ...is not an unlawful employment
79
practice under Title VII."
That same year, the Second Circuit followed a similar course. In
Simonton v. Runyon, the plaintiff raised a variety of theories to
argue that harassment based on sexual orientation is unlawful
under Title VII, none of which were accepted by the court.8 0 With
regard to Price Waterhouse, the court declined even to reach the
merits of the sex stereotyping issue because there was "no basis in
the record to surmise... that the harassment [Simonton] endured
was, in fact, based on his non-conformity with gender norms instead
of his sexual orientation."8 1 The Second Circuit did not consider the
question of whether sexual orientation discrimination is, in and of
itself, inherently based on non-conformity with gender norms and
therefore prohibited under the Supreme Court's interpretation of
this
Title VII; like the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit found
82
notion foreclosed by circuit cases predating Price Waterhouse.
Other courts continued this trend. In 2001, the Third Circuit
ruled that Title VII plaintiffs cannot invoke the sex-stereotyping
theory when their harassment is based entirely on sexual
orientation. 83 This conclusion again rested on the decisions of other
circuit courts, such as Simonton, rather than an interpretation of
Price Waterhouse itself.8 4 The Tenth Circuit in turn cited the Third
Circuit, rather than the Supreme Court, when it dismissed yet
another sex-stereotyping claim on the grounds that 'Title VII's

79 Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
80 See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) ('The law is well-settled in this
circuit and in all others to have reached the question that... Title VII does not prohibit
harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation."), overruled by Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775, 2018 WL 1040820 (2d Cir. Feb. 26 2018).
81 Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38 (emphasis added).
82 See id. at 35-36 (referencing cases from multiple circuits as authority for the

conclusion that sexual orientation is unprotected by Title VII).
"I See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Because
the evidence produced by Bibby-and, indeed, his very claim-indicated only that he was
being harassed on the basis of his sexual orientation.., there [is] no cause of action under
Title VII.").
84 See id. at 261 (first citing Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35 (2d Cir. 2000); then citing Higgins
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); and then citing
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)).
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protections... do not extend to harassment due to a person's
sexuality."8 5 Similar stories played out across other jurisdictions.8 6
The state of the law in this area therefore could be summarized
as follows: prior to 1989, the circuits unanimously determined that
Title VII does not extend to sexual orientation discrimination, as
was proper for them to do in the absence of any guidance from
Congress or the Supreme Court. After this interpretation became
predominant, the Supreme Court announced a new construction of
the statute that called into question preexisting doctrines
regarding sex discrimination. Instead of reevaluating the status of
sexual orientation in light of this new development, however, the
circuits simply invoked their own preexisting rule to declare that
sexual orientation remains unprotected by Title VII. In these
unusual circumstances, continuing to reaffirm precedent does not
serve any of the structural rationales that typically justify
stronger versions of stare decisis.
1. Statutory Stare Decisis. There are two reasons to think the
circuit courts will give heightened deference to their prior
decisions on this subject, the first of which is the doctrine of
"statutory stare decisis." The federal courts afford greater weight
to their statutory precedents as a means of demonstrating respect
for the legislative branch, which created Title VII and holds the
ultimate authority to define its scope.8 7 Some commentators have
questioned whether the circuits should utilize this doctrine at all,
since their relationship with Congress is substantially different
from that of the Supreme Court.8 8 Because the lower courts lack
authority to resolve statutory issues for the entire nation,
inconsistent interpretations are less troubling and less likely to
elicit legislative action.8 9 Whether wise or not, however, it is clear

85 See Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005)
(discussing and adopting the Third Circuit's reasoning in Bibby).
86 See, e.g., Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259-61 (dismissing the plaintiffs sex-stereotyping
argument because of his failure to raise it in the district court, while also "regard[ing] it as
settled law that" Title VII does not encompass sexual orientation).
87 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
18 See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 317, 329 (2005) (emphasizing that the lower courts' structural role is distinct
from that of the Supreme Court).
89 See id. at 344 ("An individual circuit's leverage over Congress is... decreased by the
limited geographical reach of its opinions.").
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that the circuit courts do apply statutory stare decisis, 90 and any
circuit choosing to reexamine its Title VII precedents in the near
future may well find its hands tied by that doctrine.
We therefore must ask: does upholding these precedents
actually show deference toward the legislature? To be sure, when
the lower courts first determined that Title VII does not
encompass sexual orientation discrimination, they did so with the
belief that Congress intended the words "because of sex" to be read
as narrowly as possible. 91 Subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court, however, fundamentally altered the boundaries of sex
discrimination, and the restrictive approach to Title VII originally
applied by the lower courts was no longer good law when the
circuits reexamined this issue at the turn of the century.
Despite these intervening developments, the circuits continued
to rely on the argument that Congress's failure to amend Title VII
indicates its intent to exclude sexual orientation from the realm of
sex discrimination. They did so without regard for the Supreme
Court's straightforward assertion that "'[i]n forbidding employers
to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.' "92 Indeed, the
Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress's failure to amend
Title VII should not be construed as a limit on the statute's
scope. 93 But the lower courts did not take the time to consider
90 See, e.g., Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 136 F.3d
34, 42 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of
statutory construction .... (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977)));
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Steinberg, 32
F.3d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhere is a strong presumption of continued validity that
adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute." (quoting Square D Ca v. Niagara
Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986))).
91 See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.3d 1081, 1085 ('The phrase in Title VII
prohibiting discrimination based on sex ...implies that it is unlawful to discriminate
against women because they are women and against men because they are men.').
92 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
93 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) ("[M]ale-on-male
sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.').
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whether these holdings might require them to change their
treatment of sexual orientation claims.
If there is structural tension to be found here, then, it is not
between the legislative and judicial branches; it is within the
Judiciary itself, and unquestioning adherence to questionable
precedent is the source of this tension rather than the solution.
The circuit courts do not serve Congress or the constitutional
separation of powers by continuing to ignore intervening cases.
Unless overridden, the Supreme Court's interpretive decisions
"effectively become part of the statutory scheme," 94 and the lower
courts may not consciously disregard them any more than they
may disregard the text of Title VIT. Indeed, Price Waterhouse and
its progeny had already been on the books for over a decade,
undisturbed by any negative response from Congress, when cases
like Simonton and Spearman reached appeal. Thus, if we are to
interpret congressional silence as an implied stamp of approval,
then the circuits' refusal to apply Price Waterhouse in the context
of sexual orientation should actually be seen as defiance, rather
than deference, toward the legislative branch.
2. Circuit Practices. Alternatively, the circuit courts may
choose to impose a higher standard of stare decisis out of respect
for their subordinate role within the Judiciary. The circuits have
demonstrated a strong reluctance to overturn their prior rulings,
one that goes beyond the Supreme Court's traditional guidelines
for stare decisis, and have preferred, whenever possible, to allow
higher authorities to correct their mistakes. 95 This rationale is
also inapplicable here, however, because the lower courts have
already overstepped their authority by reaffirming their own prior
cases without due regard for intervening changes in the law.
After all, when the circuits apply a strong presumption against
overturning their precedent, they do so under the assumption that
higher authorities have not called that precedent into question; if
either Congress or the Supreme Court has spoken, the
intermediate courts of appeals acknowledge that their own

94 Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).

91 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing a circuit court's adherence to
stare decisis).
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precedent must give way. 96 So although Spearman, Simonton, and
related cases did not discuss any higher standard of stare decisis
(instead opting not to reevaluate precedent at all), such a standard
The existence of Price
would not have applied regardless.
Waterhouse, an intervening change in the controlling law, would
have required an exception to the general rule.
If a heightened standard did not apply in the first instance, why
should the courts apply one now? One answer could be that,
although the circuit courts erred by disregarding Price Waterhouse,
the Supreme Court still has the power to correct that mistake and
should be allowed to do so. Perhaps Price Waterhouse, properly
interpreted, does mandate that Title VII prohibits discrimination
based on sexual orientation, but would it not be better for the
Supreme Court to answer this question definitively, rather than
have ever-changing answers among the lower courts?
That argument might hold water if the circuit courts had
misapplied a relevant Supreme Court decision, but it loses much of
its force in this context, where they have failed to apply one
entirely. It is one thing to assert that the lower courts should, for
stability's sake, stick to one interpretation of a controlling case and
allow the Supreme Court to correct any analytical errors; it is
another thing to say that they may ignore that same case and,
having done so once, must continue to ignore it indefinitely until
the Supreme Court chastises them for insubordination. Surely
stare decisis, a doctrine grounded largely in practical concerns,
does not require such an impractical process.
In short, these circumstances provide no compelling reasons to
give stare decisis additional weight. The doctrine of statutory
stare decisis, meant to protect the institutional relationship
between the legislative and judicial branches of government, does
not serve that goal by allowing the circuit courts to remain at odds
with the Supreme Court's authoritative construction of Title VII,
which Congress has left intact for several decades. Similarly, the

96 See United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[O]ur first duty is
to follow the dictates of the United States Supreme Court."); United States v. LaraUnzueta, 735 F.3d 954, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[W]e give considerable weight to prior
decisions of this court unless and until they have been overruled or undermined by the
decisions of a higher court, or other supervening developments, such as a statutory
overruling." (quoting Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 866, 891 (7th Cir. 2006)).
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extra-strong presumption of validity that the circuit courts
ordinarily afford their precedent, a presumption arising from their
lower position within the judicial hierarchy, defeats its own
purpose if it permits the lower courts to preserve their own cases
in the face of a conflicting decision of the Supreme Court. Indeed,
in this situation, an increased standard of stare decisis actually
creates more structural problems than it solves.
B. PRAGMATIC CONCERNS STILL REQUIRE SOME DEFERENCE TO
STARE DECISIS

Given these unique complications, one could venture even
further and argue that the cases like Spearman and Simonton
should not have any stare decisis effect whatsoever. At least one
district court within the Second Circuit has entirely rejected
Simonton's validity on the grounds that it is irreconcilable with
Price Waterhouse.97 That approach is attractive in its simplicity,
but it also avoids the reality that many of the pragmatic values
underlying stare decisis, such as stability and predictability in the
judicial process, are still relevant to this issue.
The currently predominant view that sexual orientation claims
are not cognizable under Title VII may be mistaken, but it is
nonetheless a mistake that has been in effect for over thirty years.
That fact alone merits some amount of deference because stare
decisis protects even clearly erroneous decisions. As the Seventh
Circuit has stated, the essence of stare decisis is an understanding
"that the mere existence of certain decisions becomes a reason for
adhering to their holdings in subsequent cases. 9 8 This principle,
rooted in the desire for an orderly and reliable system of justice, is
not diminished by the structural issues discussed above and
remains a valid reason for the courts to maintain the status quo.
So although it would be easier to remove stare decisis from the
equation entirely, doing so would reach the correct conclusion
through flawed reasoning. The courts would merely be exchanging
one faulty analysis for another, which hardly provides the clarity
97 See Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., 221 F. Supp. 3d 255, 270 (D. Conn. 2016)
("[R]econciliation of Simonton and Price Waterhouse produces untenable results.").
98 Midlock v. Apple Vacations W., Inc., 406 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2005) (first citing
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); and then citing Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-65 (1992)).
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Instead, circuit courts
that this area of law sorely needs.
confronting this issue in the future should evaluate their
precedent under the "ordinary" framework of stare decisis, without
any overlay of heightened deference.
This analysis would utilize the same set of practical
considerations that the Supreme Court has applied in
constitutional and common law contexts, where structural
concerns of divided government are not in play: (1) workability, (2)
reliance, (3) intervening legal developments in related areas of
law, (4) societal changes, and (5) quality of reasoning. Such an
approach gives the fundamental principles of stare decisis their
due, while simultaneously avoiding the institutional complications
that would arise under a heightened standard.
Although I reach the same conclusion using this analysis, it is
important to note that the choice to apply these factors, rather than
disregard stare decisis entirely, is not merely semantic. One can
imagine situations in which a different rule, despite being stripped
of heightened deference, would nonetheless pass muster under this
framework and be entitled to the protection of stare decisis. For
example, it is possible that a legal rule with the same unusual
background as this one could generate substantial reliance within
certain industries or businesses, or that such a rule could prove
highly workable in practice. In those circumstances, considerations
of stare decisis might require the circuit courts to stay their hand
until Congress or the Supreme Court intervenes to correct their
previous error. As I will attempt to demonstrate, however, no such
reasons for deference exist in this instance.
C. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK

1. Workability. As discussed above, the existing cases have
given much attention to the practical shortcomings of the sexstereotyping doctrine as it currently stands. Almost since its
inception, numerous courts have expressed frustration with a rule
that requires them to scrutinize Title VII complaints with a finetooth comb, attempting to separate cognizable sex-stereotyping
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claims from non-cognizable sexual orientation claims.9 9 Some
have found the task to be a fool's errand, forcing the courts to
search in vain for a line that does not actually exist. 100
Others have been more optimistic, stating that a principled
distinction is possible and that sexual orientation is simply
"irrelevant" under Title VII. 10 1 Yet judges and commenters alike
have questioned whether these courts are actually practicing what
they preach, noting that homosexual plaintiffs fail in their sexstereotyping claims with far greater frequency than their
10 2
heterosexual counterparts.
Given such pervasive criticism, stretching across various
jurisdictions and persisting for over a decade, it is fair to conclude
that the current rule has proven unworkable. Nor does it appear
that a solution is on the horizon, considering that the courts are
still struggling to apply this framework so many years after its
creation. Thus, concerns of workability favor reexamination of the
current framework.
2. Reliance. There are two contexts in which reliance interests
receive significant attention: (1) cases involving contractual rules,
which form the basis of countless daily transactions,10 3 and (2)

9 See, e.g., Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (D. Mass. 2002) ("[T]he line
between discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of sex is
hardly clear.").
100 See Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ("Simply
put, the line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is 'difficult to
draw' because that line does not exist.... ."); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prod., Inc., 332
F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring) (criticizing the current rule for
"saddl[ing] the courts with the making of distinctions that are beyond the practical capacity
of the litigation process"), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339
(7th Cir. 2017).
101 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002).
102 See Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U.
L. REV. 715, 746, 748 (2014) (demonstrating that courts consistently dismiss claims in
which the plaintiff was "thought to be gay," while upholding those in which the plaintiff
merely was described as "look[ing] gay" (emphasis added)); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll.,
S. Bend, 830 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 3, 2016), rev'd en banc sub
nom. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (describing the tendency of many courts to "throw out the
baby with the bathwater" whenever the complaint raises issues of sexual orientation).
103 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) ("Considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved .. ");see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56 (1992) ("[T]he classic case for weighing reliance heavily in
favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the commercial context, where advance planning
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cases of criminal procedure, in which law enforcement officers
require clear and consistent rules to carry out their duties
effectively. 10 4 In those areas, the consequences of overruling a
longstanding doctrine are obvious and substantial. This is not so
with Title VII, a remedial statute targeting workplace
discrimination, for it seems a stretch to suggest that private
employers have legitimately "relied" on the ability to treat
employees differently for reasons that have nothing to do with
work performance.
Nevertheless, while reliance interests are not readily apparent in
this context, courts may be cautious of replacing a rule of law that
has existed for many years. Several cases have acknowledged that
the age of a given precedent is an important consideration for stare
decisis, 10 5 since continuity gradually strengthens our expectations
that the status quo will remain in place. Most decisions do not
expound on this type of reliance to any great extent, but they do
suggest that a period of twenty years is insufficient to bolster stare
decisis. 10 6 It is therefore unlikely'that the precedents at issue here,
most of them decided in the past two decades, should receive any
special protection on account of their age.
3. Intervening Legal Developments. The EEOC's decision in
Baldwin, whatever deference the courts might owe to it, is
undoubtedly a landmark development in the law of employment
discrimination. Now that the agency tasked with enforcing Title
VII has declared sexual orientation discrimination to be inherently
"because of sex," the contours of sex discrimination are no longer
what they were when the Seventh Circuit declared: "homosexuals
10 7
and transvestites do not enjoy Title VII protection."
On the contrary, the EEOC's new position necessarily means
that many gay employees do enjoy Title VII protections, so long as
(citation omitted) (citing Payne v.
of great precision is most obviously a necessity ....
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
104 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000) (declining to overrule
precedent because it had "become embedded in routine police practice to the point where
[Miranda] warnings have become part of our national culture").
105 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010) ("[T]he
relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the
antiquity of the precedent ... ").
106 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 793 (2009) ("[T]he opinion is only two decades
old, and eliminating it would not upset expectations.").
107 Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).
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they work within the federal government.10 8 Should the circuits
continue to uphold their precedent on this issue, they are effectively
creating a regime in which the same statutory language protects
different types of employees in different ways. If predictability and
consistency are truly the primary goals of stare decisis, such a
result seems counterproductive and should be troubling.
Moreover, the legal status of sexual orientation has
substantially changed in a variety of other ways. For instance,
many of the cases discussed above were decided at a time when
some states still criminalized same-sex intimacy, yet such statutes
were deemed unconstitutional in 2003.109 More recently, the
Supreme Court has ruled that same-sex couples have a
constitutional right to marry, 110 and much discussion has centered
on that decision's implications for the future of employment law. 1
Simply put, the law's current treatment of homosexuality would be
unrecognizable to those courts that first excluded it from Title
VII's purview. Consequently, the rule we have inherited from
them seems out of touch with the modern legal landscape.
4. Changes in Social Context. Although this factor remains
vaguely defined, the Supreme Court has suggested that changes in
the broader social landscape and within our shared conceptions of
justice should inform the stare decisis inquiry. 11 2 As such, it is
important to notice how the courts have gone out of their way to
emphasize that sexual orientation discrimination is at odds with

108 Baldwin, 0120133080 (EEOC), 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15, 2015).

.9 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating anti-sodomy statutes).
110 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (striking down state bans on
same-sex marriages).
M See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: The
Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA.L. REV. 1099, 1099 (2015) (providing a critical examination
of "the relationship between same-sex marriage and workplace rights"); see also Hively v.
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., S. Bend, 830 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 3, 2016),
rev'd en banc sub nom. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) ('From an employee's perspective, the
right to marriage might not feel like a real right if she can be fired for exercising it.").
112 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (noting that a
precedent may become more vulnerable when it "'has been found to be inconsistent with
the sense of justice or with the social welfare'" (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (asking "whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen
so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification").
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our society's values of equality and fairness, even as they continue

to insist that Title VII does not prohibit

it.113

That being said, these observations are also far from new. Even
the earliest opinions on this issue make a point of noting that
114
discrimination based on sexual orientation is morally repugnant.
Thus, it does not appear that our society's disapproval of such
discrimination is a completely recent phenomenon, passing
unnoticed by the courts until now. In truth, the circuits have
denounced such discrimination consistently. But, they have been
equally consistent in finding that federal law provides no recourse.
5. Quality of Reasoning. Evaluating the reasoning of these
precedents is a difficult task, chiefly because there is so little
reasoning to evaluate. As laid out above, most of the controlling
appellate opinions on this issue simply cite cases predating Price
Waterhouse and move on, without giving any further discussion to
Thus, the
account for intervening changes in the law. 11 5
underlying problem with these decisions is not that they have poor
reasoning; it is that they have no reasoning.
Nor have those courts subsequently applying current doctrine
Instead, they have
offered any arguments in its defense.
frequently found that there is no readily discernible basis for the
distinction between sexual orientation claims and sex-stereotyping
claims. 11 6 Thus, the EEOC seems to have been correct when it
accused the courts of relying solely on "dated decisions" rather
than reasoned analysis.117
In summary, it appears that (1) the workability of the current
rule, (2) intervening changes in related areas of law, and (3) the

113 See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764-65 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The
");
harassment alleged by [the plaintiff] reflects conduct that is socially unacceptable ....
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Harassment on
the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our society.").
114 See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e do not
condone discrimination in any form....").
115 See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
116 See, e.g., Hively, 830 F.3d at 705 ("Discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual

employees comes about because their behavior is seen as failing to comply with the
quintessential gender stereotype... that men should have romantic and sexual relationships
only with women, and women should have romantic and sexual relationships only with men.");
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[A)ll homosexuals, by
definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.").
117 Baldwin, 0120133080 (EEOC), 2015 WL 4397641, at *8 n.l (July 15, 2015).
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lack of satisfactory reasoning to support these earlier decisions
weigh strongly in favor of overturning precedent.
Reliance
interests, if present at all, are relatively weak and not of a type
that would typically move the courts to invoke stare decisis. The
only remaining factor, social context, is of unclear application to
this issue and therefore is unlikely to sway the analysis in either
direction.
Under this framework, then, it is clear that a
compelling case exists for the circuit courts to depart from their
prior holdings that sexual orientation claims are not cognizable as
sex discrimination under Title VII.
IV. CONCLUSION

Nearly three decades have passed since the Supreme Court
stated that Congress intended Title VII "to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from
sex stereotypes."1 18 Those words contained no caveats or provisos.
They were not followed by the word "but." The Court gave no
reason to believe that this promise of protection was any more
limited than it appeared. Yet the circuit courts have limited it,
holding time and again that one particular stereotype about the
sexes-and no other-is beyond Title VII's reach. The basis for
this limitation is not found within Price Waterhouse itself, or any
other decision of the Supreme Court. It comes instead from
circuits' own decisions.
The EEOC has rejected the position of the courts, thereby
offering federal employees relief under Title VII when they
experience disparate treatment on the basis of their sexual
orientation. The courts largely have declined to follow the EEOC's
lead, however, with regard to other sectors of employment, even as
they confess their agreement with much of Baldwin's logic. Agree
though they might, the lower courts consider themselves bound by
stare decisis to maintain the uneasy status quo that they have
created and perpetuated independently of Congress and the
Supreme Court.

118 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n.13 (1978)).
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If the circuit courts only would stop to consider the function
that stare decisis serves within our judicial system, and the
rationales that justify its use, they would find that it poses no
obstacle here. When one examines the unusual history of sexstereotyping doctrine, and the structural issues implicated by that
history, it becomes clear that heightened versions of stare decisis
have no application in this context. Any remaining reasons to
preserve these precedents, such as practical concerns of stability
and consistency, are far outweighed by the other "pragmatic
considerations" that have traditionally been sufficient to overturn
prior decisions.
Circuits that reexamine this issue in the future should devote
greater discussion and analysis to the issue of stare decisis and its
applicability to these cases. Doing so would reveal that the
animating principles of that doctrine actually provide more reason,
not less, to depart from precedent. Nor should these issues be left
for another day, in the hopes that higher authorities will move to
correct prior missteps. This question of statutory interpretation
has profound consequences for the dignity and livelihood of
numerous working citizens, and if those persons are to be denied
Title VII's protection, that conclusion should follow due analysis
rather than reflexive reliance on prior cases.
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